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Abstract: In previous studies, taxing income or consumption hinders long-run growth. Incorporating 
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growth effects of taxing consumption and labor income do not exist. 
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Growth eﬀects of taxation have been studied extensively in the recent literature on taxation
(e.g., Judd, 1985; Chamley, 1986; King and Rebelo, 1990; Rebelo, 1991; Jones et al., 1993; Pecorino,
1993; Devereux and Love, 1994; Stokey and Rebelo, 1995; Milesi-Ferretti and Roubini, 1998), using
either the neoclassical growth model with physical capital only, or the two-sector growth model
with both human and physical capital. The typical view in the previous studies is that the three
commonly used taxes (on consumption, labor or capital income) have in general negative eﬀects
on long-run growth. Income taxes create disincentives for investment and work by reducing the
after-tax rates of return on capital and labor, while consumption taxes create disincentives for work
by reducing the price of leisure relative to consumption.
The objective of this paper is to reexamine the growth eﬀects of taxation by using a very recent
growth model of Howitt (1999) where innovation is the engine of long-run growth. In this model
as well as in a few others (e.g., Segerstrom, 1998; Young, 1998), there is no scale eﬀect, in terms
of the eﬀect of the size of the population on growth that was present in earlier R&D endogenous
growth models resulting from spillovers of knowledge or investment (e.g., Romer, 1990; Grossman
and Helpman, 1991; Aghion and Howitt, 1992).1 Using the non-scale growth models in the analysis
of the growth eﬀects of taxation is appealing, because innovations are viewed by many as the main
contributor to long-run growth, and because there is lack of clear evidence for the presence of such
a scale eﬀect.
We extend the non-scale R&D growth model by considering two important factors that have
been used in the literature on taxation and growth: saving and the trade-oﬀ between labor and
leisure. We show that although taxes on consumption and labor income change the labor-leisure
choice and hence the size of the eﬀective labor force, they do not inﬂuence long-run growth in this
non-scale R&D model. The reason is that the scale eﬀect of changes in the size of the eﬀective labor
force is nulliﬁed by product proliferation. A capital-income tax, as in other models, is harmful for
growth by discouraging saving and capital investment.
1Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, p.442) found only a weak and minor scale eﬀect in a cross-country panel data set.
1The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the model. Section
3 characterizes the equilibrium and derives the results. The last section concludes.
2. The model
We extend the Schumpeterian framework of Howitt (1999) by considering saving and leisure.
At ﬁrst glance the framework seems to be an overly complicated model for studying the growth
eﬀects of taxation. The rationale for using such a model will become clear when we see the channels
through which taxes aﬀect long-run growth, however. In this extended model, both saving and labor
supply are determined by intertemporal utility maximization of a representative household as in
the literature on taxation vs. growth. There is a ﬁnal-good sector, using a variety of intermediate
goods whose range expands and quality improves over time through innovation.
2.1. Households
We assume that the representative household is endowed with one unit ﬂow of time which
is allocated between leisure lt and production 1  lt. We also assume that the representative











where ¯ Ct is per capita consumption; Lt is the size of population, growing at a constant rate gL > 0;
 is the constant rate of time preference;  is the elasticity of marginal utility; and t refers to time.
Suppose that the government imposes a consumption tax (at a ﬂat rate) c, a labor-income tax
L, and a capital-income tax k to collect revenue for lump-sum transfers and subsidies on R&D.
Having in mind that tax rates are relatively stable over time in the real world, we only consider
a case where tax rates are stationary, otherwise technical complexity would be substantial. The
representative household’s budget constraint is
(1 + c) ¯ Ct = Wt(1  L)(1  lt) + [rt(1  k)  gL] ¯ Kt + ¯ Tt  ˙ ¯ Kt; (2)
where ¯ Kt is per capita capital asset; ¯ Tt is per capita lump-sum transfer; Wt is the wage rate; and rt
is the interest rate. A dot above a variable represents the time change rate of that variable. Note
that the ﬁnal good is used as the numeraire.
2The representative household chooses consumption ¯ Ct and leisure lt to maximize (1) subject to





rt(1  k)  

; (3)
and the relationship between leisure and consumption:
lt =
(1 + c) ¯ Ct
(1  L)Wt
: (4)
In (3), the capital-income tax has a direct negative eﬀect on consumption growth by reducing
the after-tax rate of return to capital, while all taxes may aﬀect consumption growth through the
interest rate. In (4), a higher labor-income tax, or a higher consumption tax, tends to raise leisure
relative to consumption by lowering the after-tax wage, or by raising the price of consumption.
2.2. Technologies
There are ﬁve types of production activities in this economy: ﬁnal-good production, intermediate-
good production (Qt sectors), physical capital accumulation, vertical and horizontal innovations.
It is assumed that perfect competition prevails in all sectors except the intermediate sectors where
there exists temporary monopoly power. We brieﬂy describe each type of the activities below; for
more details, see Howitt (1999) and Aghion and Howitt (1992, 1996).
2.2.1. Final-good production







itdi; 0 <  < 1; (5)
where Yt is ﬁnal output; LYt and xit are, respectively, labor and the ﬂow of intermediate good i.
The parameter  measures the contribution of an intermediate good to the ﬁnal-good production
2In the original model of Howitt (1999), labor is used only in the intermediate-good production. We assume that
both the ﬁnal sector and the intermediate sectors use labor as their inputs to allow the full strength of tax distortions
on the labor-leisure trade-oﬀ.
3and inversely measures the intermediate monopolist’s market power. The parameter Ait is the
productivity coeﬃcient of intermediate good i.
Final output is allocated among vertical R&D expenditures (Nvt), horizontal R&D expenditures
(Nht), total consumption (Ct), and investment in capital ( ˙ Kt):
Yt = Nvt + Nht + Ct + ˙ Kt: (6)
In (6), we abstract from capital depreciation for simplicity.
The competitive ﬁnal sector yields the demand for both labor and the intermediate good i








it ; 8i 2 [0;Qt]; (8)
where pit is the price of intermediate good i in terms of the ﬁnal good.
2.2.2. Intermediate-good production








; 0 <  < 1: (9)
In (9), we deﬂate the capital input Kit by the productivity parameter Ait to reﬂect the fact that
more recent innovations are more capital intensive.3 Given the wage rate Wt, the interest rate rt,
and the ﬁnal sector’s demand for intermediate goods (8), each intermediate-good producer chooses
a monopolistic price, pit, to maximize its proﬁt








Yt  WtLit  rtKit: (10)
The solution for this gives the proﬁt ﬂow at date s for an intermediate-good producer who uses a
technology of vintage t (see Appendix B)
ts = Amax











3Technically, this is a necessary assumption that makes technological progress purely labor augmenting and gen-
erates a steady state with a constant interest rate.
4where Amax
t  maxfAit;i 2 [0;Qt]g is the leading-edge productivity parameter; yt  Y=(QtAmax
t )
is the productivity-adjusted output; g is the steady-state growth rate of per capita output; and Γ is
a parameter determined by the distribution of the relative productivity of intermediate goods a 
Ait=Amax

















where  > 0 is a parameter to be explained later.
2.2.3. Vertical R&D
A vertical R&D innovation, once successful, improves an existing intermediate product, and
replaces the existing one in the ﬁnal-good production. The successful innovator becomes the tem-
porary monopolist until the arrival of the next successful innovation in that sector. Assume that
vertical innovations follow a Poisson process, with a common arrival rate given by
t = nt; nt = Nvt=(QtAmax
t );  > 0; (12)
where  is the productivity parameter of vertical R&D, and nt is the productivity-adjusted expen-
diture on vertical R&D in each sector. Deﬂating vertical R&D expenditures by the leading-edge
productivity parameter means that the complexity of innovation increases proportionally to the
technological progress. Since the expected return on investment in vertical R&D is the same in
each intermediate sector, the amount of expenditure on vertical R&D is also the same in each
sector.
A vertical R&D ﬁrm chooses its R&D expenditure Nvt=Qt to maximize its proﬁt ftVvt (1
sv)Nvt=Qtg, where Vvt is the expected value of a vertical innovation and sv is the subsidy rate
on vertical R&D. Assume that the successful innovator in each intermediate sector enters into
Bertrand competition with the previous incumbent in that sector and that the previous incumbent
exits and cannot threaten to reenter. So the successful innovator can charge a monopolist price. As
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5In (13), the discount rate in the denominator includes four terms: the interest rate r, the arrival
rate of vertical innovations , the rate of gradual “crowding out” g=(1) due to the continual
rise in wages, and the growth rate of proﬁts (gL) due to the population growth. The last term
(gL) comes from the fact that labor is an input in the ﬁnal-good production; this term does not
appear in Howitt (1999) because labor is not used in the ﬁnal sector in his model. For nt > 0, the






r + n +
g
1  gL
= 1  sv: (14)
This equation says that the after-subsidy marginal cost of R&D (the far right-hand side) equals
the expected marginal beneﬁt of R&D.
2.2.4. Horizontal R&D
A horizontal R&D innovation aims at a new intermediate product. A successful innovator
becomes the monopolist of his newly created product until the product is improved by a vertical
innovation. Assuming diminishing returns to expenditures on horizontal R&D, we can specify the






where  (;) is increasing and concave, and has constant-returns to scale. Similar to vertical R&D,
the inputs Nht and Yt in horizontal R&D are deﬂated by the leading-edge productivity parameter.
Equation (15) implies that the average product ˙ Qt=Nht is a decreasing function of the fraction
ht  Nht=Yt of ﬁnal output allocated to horizontal R&D. Also assume that the productivity of a
newly created intermediate good is drawn randomly from the distribution of existing intermediate



















Vht  (1  sh)Nht
o
, where sh is the subsidy rate on horizontal R&D. The ﬁrst-




= 1  sh; (17)
where  (ht)   (ht;1) with  0 > 0 and  00 < 0. Equation (17) states that the after-subsidy
marginal cost of R&D (the right-hand side) equals the expected marginal beneﬁt of R&D (the
left-hand side).
2.2.5. Knowledge spillovers
Following Caballero and Jaﬀe (1993) and Howitt (1999), we assume that growth in the leading-
edge productivity Amax
t results from knowledge spillovers of vertical innovations. More speciﬁcally,
the leading-edge productivity Amax
t is assumed to grow at a rate proportional to the aggregate
rate of vertical innovations; and the factor of this proportionality is assumed to equal =Qt > 0,
which measures the marginal impact of each innovation on the stock of public knowledge, where
 > 0 is a parameter. This marginal impact of each innovation depends negatively on the number
of intermediate goods because as the number of intermediate goods rises, an innovation of a given
size in any intermediate sector will have a smaller impact on the aggregate economy. Since the
aggregate ﬂow of vertical innovations equals the number of intermediate sectors Qt times the ﬂow











(ntQt) = nt;  > 0: (18)
From (18), we can see that the potential supply-side scale eﬀect of increasing R&D expenditures
is nulliﬁed by the rise in the number of intermediate goods, which reduces the marginal spillover
eﬀect =Qt of each innovation.
As the productivity of a newly created intermediate good is randomly drawn from the dis-
tribution of the existing intermediate goods, the productivity distribution of new intermediate
goods is identical to the productivity distribution of existing intermediate goods. As a result,
7the distribution of relative productivity ait  Ait=Amax
t converges to the invariant distribution











5 = Γ: (19)
2.3. Government budget constraint
Suppose that the government’s budget is balanced at each point in time
cCt + krtKt + LWt(1  lt)Lt = Tt + svNvt + shNht; (20)
where Ct, Kt and Tt are aggregate variables. In (20), the left-hand side is the government’s tax
revenue from consumption cCt, capital income krtKt and labor income LWt(1  lt)Lt, and the
right-hand side is the government’s expenditures on lump-sum transfer Tt, subsidies on vertical
R&D svNvt and subsidies on horizontal R&D shNht.
3. Steady-state equilibrium and results
In a steady-state balanced growth equilibrium, stationarity is imposed on the allocation of
time (lt), and on the ratios of output, consumption, and capital stock to productivity in terms of
QtAmax
t , such as yt, ct = Ct=(QtAmax
t ), and kt = Kt=(QtAmax
t ). Stationarity is also imposed on
the amount of vertical R&D expenditure per product (nt), the fraction of ﬁnal output allocated to
horizontal R&D (ht), and the interest rate (rt). In addition, the wage rate (Wt), the number of
intermediate goods (Qt), and the leading-edge productivity (Amax
t ) grow at constant rates g, gQ,
and gA, respectively. From equation (A.13), the productivity-adjusted output is














must be stationary by (21). Thus, the growth rate of the number of intermediate goods must satisfy
gQ =





From (22), the growth rate of the number of intermediate goods is proportional to, and greater than,
the growth rate of the population. Unlike the original model of Howitt (1999), here the number
8of intermediate goods Qt grows faster than the population. The reason is as follows. On the
one hand, by construction, the equilibrium labor employment in all intermediate sectors,
R Qt
0 Litdi,




=Qt, times the number
of intermediate sectors, Qt. On the other hand, the labor market clearing condition requires that
the equilibrium labor employment in all intermediate sectors must grow at the same rate as the
population, gL. We can easily verify that the average labor employment in each intermediate sector
grows more slowly than the population. As a result, the number of intermediate sectors must grow
faster than the population.
Per capita output is ¯ Yt = QtAmax
t yt=Lt, and its growth rate, g, must satisfy






From (23), we can see that the growth rate of per capita output depends positively on both the
growth rate of the leading-edge productivity and the population growth rate. Also diﬀerent from
Howitt (1999), per capita output grows faster than the leading-edge productivity because the
number of intermediate goods increases faster than the population.
Now the production function of horizontal R&D (15) implies  (h)y = gQ, which gives the
equilibrium productivity-adjusted output
y = gQ= (h) =





In (24), the productivity-adjusted output relates positively to the population growth rate but
negatively to the horizontal R&D intensity. The stationary equilibrium interest rate results from





Equation (25) shows the usual positive relationship between the equilibrium interest rate and the
equilibrium growth rate of per capita output.
To see the eﬀects of taxation on the equilibrium growth rate more clearly, we further simplify
the steady-state equilibrium conditions. Substituting (13) and (16), together with (12), (18), (19)
9and (23)-(25), into (14) and (17), we have the following two equilibrium conditions that determine




























= 1  sv: (V)
According to equation (H), the horizontal R&D intensity h is independent of the growth rate of
per capita output g because there is only one value of h at which the marginal values of horizontal
and vertical R&D are equal. According to equation (V), the growth rate of per capita output g
depends negatively on horizontal R&D intensity h. This negative inﬂuence of the horizontal R&D
intensity on the growth of per capita output arises because an increase in the horizontal R&D
intensity reduces the productivity-adjusted output as shown in (24), which in turn lowers the proﬁt
ﬂow of a successful vertical innovator, and thus discourages investment in vertical R&D. Also note
that the population growth rate, gL, in (V) is exogenously given in this model. From these two
equilibrium conditions, we can see that there exists a unique steady-state equilibrium as long as
 is small enough (but  > [1 + (1  )=()]gL ). The comparative-static results are similar to
those in Proposition 1 of Howitt (1999).
What are the implications of the taxes for long-run growth? Since the consumption tax c and
the labor-income tax L are absent in the two equilibrium conditions (H) and (V), they do not
aﬀect long-run economic growth, that is, @g=@L = @g=@c = 0. In our model, the only channel
through which the consumption and labor-income taxes can potentially aﬀect long-run growth is
the size of the eﬀective labor force since they increase leisure in (4). These tax distortions on the
eﬀective labor force (1  lt)Lt aﬀect the productivity-adjusted output yt in (21), and thus enter
the innovators’ proﬁt in (11) and the values of innovation in (13) and (16) from the demand side
4The solution for other variables is given in Appendix C.
10through yt. Without product proliferation (from horizontal innovation), these taxes would hinder
long-run growth. When product proliferation arises from horizontal R&D investment and ﬁnal
output through a constant-returns-to-scale technology as in (15), the productivity-adjusted output
y is determined by the rate of product proliferation gQ and the horizontal R&D intensity h as in
(24). The two determinants of y are independent of the size of the eﬀective labor force and the taxes
(c;L). First, the rate of product proliferation is proportional to the rate of population growth
and independent of the taxes in (22). Second, the horizontal R&D intensity h may be aﬀected by
the size of the eﬀective labor force and the tax distortions as mentioned above. However, because
of the proportional relation between the values of the two types of innovation Vht = ΓVvt by (13),
(16) and (19), the scale eﬀect and the tax distortions through y on the marginal values of the two
types of innovation are proportional and cancel out entirely in (H) where the marginal values of
innovation are equalized. As a result, the labor income tax and the consumption tax do not aﬀect
the growth rate of per capita output.
By contrast, the eﬀect of the capital-income tax on growth is negative by (V), since in equilib-
rium @h=@k = 0 and sign @g=@k = sign [( + g)] < 0 for all g  0, when holding subsidy rates
sh and sv constant, and leaving the task of balancing the government budget to residual changes in
lump-sum transfers Tt. We illustrate the case with a rise in the capital-income tax rate in Figure
1, where such a tax rise does not aﬀect the horizontal line (H) but it shifts the downward-sloping
curve (V) to the left, and thereby reduces the long-run growth rate.5 Summing up the discussion,
we have
[Figure 1 about here]
Proposition 1. The long-run growth rate of per capita output depends negatively on the capital-
income tax. However, it is independent of the consumption tax and the labor-income tax.
Although taxes on consumption and labor income aﬀect the labor-leisure choice and hence the
size of the eﬀective labor force, they do not inﬂuence long-run growth in this non-scale R&D model
5From the equations in Appendix C, we can see that all the three taxes have level eﬀects. That is, they aﬀect the
magnitudes of labor supply, output, consumption and others.
11in contrast to the conventional view. The reason is that the scale eﬀect on long-run growth of
changes in the size of the eﬀective labor force, which existed in earlier Schumpeterian models, is
nulliﬁed by product proliferation, keeping the reward to any speciﬁc innovation unchanged. As in
the literature, one the other hand, a capital-income tax is harmful for growth, since it depresses
saving and capital investment.
4. Conclusions
By incorporating endogenous saving and labor-leisure choices into the non-scale R&D growth
model of Howitt (1999), this paper showed that long-run growth is independent of both consumption
taxes and labor-income taxes, and is only aﬀected negatively by capital-income taxes. This result
stands in sharp contrast with the conventional conclusion that in general all the three types of
taxation have negative eﬀects on long-run economic growth. This diﬀerent conclusion is mainly
reached by our use of the R&D growth model that has no scale eﬀect regarding the size of the
eﬀective labor force. While emphasizing innovation, we abstracted from other growth determinants
like human capital investment used in the literature. In this sense, our results complement those in
the literature. The policy implication of our results is that in the technology-leading countries where
innovation is important for long-run growth, more reliance on consumption taxes or labor-income
taxes than on capital-income taxes for public transfers or subsidies may beneﬁt the economy.
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12Appendix A: The solution to the representative household’s optimization problem. The
current-value Hamiltonian function and the ﬁrst-order conditions for the representative household’s















= Lt ¯ C
t l
(1)
t  t(1 + c) = 0; (A.1)
@H
@lt
= Lt ¯ C1
t l
(1)1
t  tWt(1  L) = 0; (A.2)
@H
@ ¯ Kt
= t[rt(1  k)  gL] = t  ˙ t; (A.3)
lim
t!1
ett ¯ Kt = 0; (A.4)
where t is the co-state variable. Solving the above ﬁrst-order conditions gives the optimal time
path of per capita consumption (3) and the relationship between leisure and consumption (4).
Appendix B: Derivation of equation (11). The ﬁrst-order conditions for intermediate monop-




rt = 2(1  )Aitx
itL1
Yt =Kit: (A.6)
Solving equations (A.5) and (A.6) gives the intermediate sector i’s demand for labor and capital

















































Using equations (5), (7), (9), (A.5) and (A.6), along with the factor market equilibrium conditions
R Qt
0 Litdi + LYt = (1  lt)Lt and
R Qt
0 Kitdi = Kt, we have the following solution
LYt =
(1  )(1  lt)Lt
1   + 2
; (A.10)
Wt =











t [(1  lt)Lt]1(1); (A.13)
where ΓY  2(1  )1[1   + 2](1)1 and Amax
t  maxfAit;i 2 [0;Qt]g. In order
to derive the expected values of vertical and horizontal innovations, we calculate the intermediate
producer i’s proﬁt ﬂow

















1. Therefore, the proﬁt ﬂow at date s for an










From (A.10)-(A.13) and the steady-state equilibrium conditions, the interest rate rt is constant and
the wage rate Wt grows at the same constant rate g as per capita output. Thus, we can rewrite
the expression for the proﬁt ﬂow (A.15) as (11) in the text.
Appendix C: Steady-state solution for other variables. The stationary equilibrium solutions
for other variables are: c = 1
1+c
n






+ (1  L)(1   + 2) + 
o
y 
Γcy from (2), where   Tt=Yt; l =
(1+c)Γc
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